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Abstract—This paper1 examines five strategies for upset pro-
tection in Gold sequence generators used to maintain signal
acquisition in GPS receivers. This work is motivated by the
increased prevalence of single-event upsets in ultra low-power
GPS receivers. If any upset occurs in the Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR) modules, then the corresponding satellite signal
must be re-acquired, resulting in high energy expenditure and
time delay. We evaluate the performance and complexity of
methods based on error correction and modular redundancy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers are heavily used
in mobile contexts, and there is motivation to minimize power
consumption and maximize battery life in these devices. When
operating at minimal power levels, there is greater occurrence
of internal logic upsets due to noise processes and external
interference in combination with process/voltage/temperature
(PVT) variation [1], and these problems increase with the
advancement of CMOS technology [2]. Logic upsets can
manifest as momentary faults in the device’s behavior, or as
persistent faults that require re-start or signal reacquisition.
Fault tolerance has been studied for data fusion in navigational
systems that incorporate GPS receivers along with other sensor
devices. For example, the authors of [3] consider an intelligent
data fusion system to compensate for delayed or erroneous
GPS data due to acquisition loss or signal obstruction. To our
knowledge, there has not been a detailed study of options
for internal fault-tolerance to prevent acquisition loss from
occuring in GPS receivers.
GPS systems use a family of ranging signals called
Course/Acquisition (C/A) codes belonging to the family of
Gold pseudo random noise (PRN) sequences. The C/A codes
are generated from the product of two 1,023-bit PRN se-
quences called G1 and G2. Both G1 and G2 are generated
by 10-stage LFSR modules [4]. Fig. 1 shows the standard G1
generator. If the LFSR register states are disturbed, then the
corresponding C/A code state becomes corrupted, resulting in
loss of the GPS signal tracking. This problem can be mitigated
if the LFSR state registers are protected by an error correction
method. This paper presents five solutions to make a system
formed of four G1 registers (four is the minimum number of
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Fig. 1. G1 sequence generator.
satellites to determine the position of a receiver) more robust
to upset errors, and evaluates those solutions in terms of their
performance benefit and gate overhead. These solutions can
be extended and generalized for any type of LFSR register.
Values stored in all registers, at the clock cycle t, will be
represented by the matrix R(t) = (r(t)i,j ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and
1 ≤ j ≤ 10, where j is the jth position of the ith LFSR.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
describes two Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) methods,
Sec. III presents a row×column parity-check solution, and
Sec. IV presents two solutions based on Hamming codes.
Each of these sections evaluates the solutions’ performance
by computing the mean time to failure (MTTF). Sec. V
provides synthesis and performance results, and compares the
complexity as the number of equivalent NAND gates for each
solution. Finally Sec. VI offers conclusions.
II. TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY (TMR)
TMR is a classical solution for fault tolerance in electronic
systems [5]. In a TMR system, the original module (i.e.
the LFSR) is replicated three times, and error correction is
achieved by a majority vote operation. In our analysis, we
assume every flip-flop is triplicated and assigned a single
voter as shown in Fig. 2(a). We note that there are several
alternative configurations, such as the triple-voter method or
the restorative-feedback voter [6], but to minimize overhead
we only consider the most basic TMR strategy. If an upset
occurs in any one of the three LFSR modules, the other
two devices can correct and mask the fault. But once two
of the three devices fail an uncorrectable failure results. An
uncorrectable failure is inevitable in a long-running LFSR, so
we evalute the system’s reliability by calculating the system’s
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF): larger MTTF implies a more
reliable system.
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Fig. 2. Shift register with TMR protection in each flip-flop, where Rt,xi,j
denotes the xth replica of the jth flip-flop in the ith LFSR of a G1 sequence
generator group at the step t.
To compute the MTTF it is first necessary to solve the
probability distribution of system failures. It is assumed that
upset events in the replicated flip-flops are independent. Let p
be the flip-flop upset probability per time step (i.e clock cycle),
and Xk,t a random variable describing the upset state of the
kth bit in an LFSR at time step t. The stored value is either
correct (Xk,t = 0) or erroneous (Xk,t = 1). Given no overall
failure prior to time step t − 1, Pr(Xk,t−1 = 1) = p for all
k. After applying the majority vote operation, the probability
of a correct state at the voter’s output, qv , is given by:
qv = (1− p)3 + 3p (1− p)2 . (1)
Now let pc be the probability that the entire LFSR state is
correct after applying majority vote operations on all flip-flops:
pc =
10∏
k=1
qv
Let PFail be the probability of an instantaneous failure in the
complete system. This probability is expressed as
PFail = 1− pc4. (2)
Finally, we calculate Pe(t), the probability that the failure of
the complete system occurs at time step t:
Pe(t) = (1− PFail)(t−1)PFail. (3)
Since Pe(t) has a geometric distribution, the mean of this
distribution is well known and yields the MTTF:
MTTF ,
∞∑
t=1
tPe(t) =
1
PFail
. (4)
As an example, given a flip-flop upset probability p = 10−3,
we find PFail = 1.2 × 10−4, and the mean time to failure
(MTTF) is equal to 8339 cycles.
In the TMR solution the vote operation is done for every
bit of every LFSR. To reduce the complexity, it is possible to
perform voting in a single column as described in Fig. 2(b).
Since the data is shifted in a circular pattern around the LFSR,
Fig. 3. Trellis graph describing error propagation in the one-column error
correction solution.
any single error will eventually pass through the voter where
it can be corrected. The LFSR has length ten, so a single error
may persist in the system for at most ten clock cycles. One-
column voting tends to decrease (i.e. worsen) the MTTF of
TMR. In order to model the propagation of errors through the
LFSR, we use the trellis model shown in Fig. 3, which assumes
the voter is placed in column three. By choosing this position
of the voter, we garantee that every error in this system will
pass by the voter and will be corrected in at most 10 clock
cycles. Given that no system failure has occured prior to time
step t, we only need to consider a trellis depth of ten stages,
since a successul correction would have eliminated any errors
in the voter’s column at time t−10. Let pf (t−τ) be the error
probability in a flip-flop τ time-steps before it’s data reaches
the voter. Clearly p (t− 10) = 0, and for subsequent stages
we have
pf (t− τ) = p (1− pf (t− τ − 1))
+ (1− p)pf (t− τ − 1) . (5)
Iterating this calculation in the trellis model, we determine pv ,
the probability of flip-flop error in the voting column, as the
second element in the state vector Pv given by
Pv =
[
1− p p
p 1− p
]10
×
[
1
0
]
(6)
Using this model, we find the probability of a correct state at
the one-column voter’s output, qv , by substituting pv in place
of p in (1). Then the instantaneous failure probability for the
four-LFSR system is
PFail = 1− q4v . (7)
The MTTF, in this case and for p = 10−3, is equal to 854
clock cycles, nearly ten times lower than TMR. The one-
column approach trades reliabiliy for complexity gains, as
evaluated and compared in Sec. V.
III. METHOD WITH PARITY-CHECK ERROR DETECTION
In this section, we will modify the architecture of each
LFSR by adding a parity flip-flop to each row. We define
the row parity v(t)i as the modulo-2 sum over all ten values
in a single LFSR i at time step t, hence v(t)i =
⊕10
j=1 r
(t)
i,j .
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 + 1 2 3 + P
Fig. 4. New architecture of G1 LFSR with row parity.
Fig. 5. Schematic for parity-based correction of the jth flip-flop in the ith
LFSR.
Given r(t+1)i,1 = r
(t)
i,3 ⊕ r(t)i,10 , the expression for v(t+1)i can be
simplified as
v
(t+1)
i =
10⊕
j=1
r
(t+1)
i,j = (r
(t)
i,3 ⊕ r(t)i,10)⊕ (
9⊕
j=1
r
(t)
i,j )
= r
(t)
i,3 ⊕ (
10⊕
j=1
r
(t)
i,j ) = v
t
i ⊕ r(t)i,3 . (8)
Based on this equation, we add the new parity flip-flop to every
LFSR in the system, according to the architecture shown in
Fig. 4. In order to detect errors in LFSR i, we independently
compute the error as e(t)h (i) = (
⊕10
j=1 r
(t)
i,j )⊕v(t)i . If e(t)h (i) 6=
0, an odd number of errors has occurred.
The row-parity solution based on Fig. 4 is sufficient to detect
errors but cannot identify their position. In order to detect
the location of errors, a new LFSR is added to the system
comprised of the column-parity, so that
r
(t)
5,j =
4⊕
i=1
r
(t)
i,j . (9)
Since the parity LFSR is identical to the others, it only needs
to be initialized with (9) at a single time t0. Under error-
free operation, the condition described by (9) is preserved
in the LFSR state evolution. The new LFSR sytem consists
of five LFSRs: The fifth row is the parity LFSR, and the
eleventh column is the set of parity-check bits correspond-
ing to Fig. 4. The column and row errors are detected as
e
(t)
v (j) = (
⊕4
i=1 r
(t)
i,j )⊕ r(t)5,j and e(t)h (i), respectively. If there
is a row l where e(t)h (l) 6= 0, then we should find all positions
q for which e(t)v (q) 6= 0. Errors are corrected by flipping the
bit in these positions q using the XOR function as shown in
the architecture in Fig. 5. Corrected register values are denoted
as r¯ in this figure. With this method, an odd number of errors
can be corrected if they occur in only one row. The probability
of a system failure in this case is
PFail = 1−
(
(1− p)55 + 55p(1− p)54 ) . (10)
Continuing the example from the previous sections with p =
10−3, we find that PFail = 0.0014 and the MTTF is 697. This
is far below the performance of TMR. Due to its simplicity,
the parity method provides good complexity gain as discussed
in Sec. V.
IV. SOLUTION USING HAMMING CODES
Researchers previously considered the theoretical character-
istics of multi-LFSR systems protected by linear error correct-
ing codes. For example, Hadjicostis and Verghese considered
the asymptotic properties of a large group of identical LFSRs
jointly encoded using LDPC codes [7]. In this section, we
describe a similar but much smaller scale approach using a
basic Hamming code. As in the row/column parity solution, we
are using in this method parity LFSRs, which are constructed
as linear transformations of the original system. In order to
jointly encode the consituent LFSRs and produce valid parity
LFSRs, the system must obey to two criteria. First they should
be described by the same polynomial as all LFSRs in the
original system. Second, the initial states of the parity LFSRs,
represented by the matrix R(0), are obtained using a Hamming
encoding operation:
C(0) = GT ×R(0)
where GT is the transpose of the generator matrix G of the
(7,4) Hamming code and R(0) represents initial states of the
original four LFSRs. For this encoding we use the standard
Hamming generator matrix given by
G =

1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1

Since the LFSR states are updated by a linear transformation
at each time step, if no errors are generated in the system, then
the parity LFSRs will preseve the Hamming code structure [7],
i.e. at any time step t,
C(t) = GT ×R(t).
Let Q(t) be the new encoded system, defined by
Q(t) ,
(
S(t)
C(t)
)
. The system is now a matrix with 10 columns
Q(t) = (Q
(t)
1 , · · · , R(t)10 ). By decoding all columns of Q(t), we
are able to detect and correct errors present in each column
decoded at a step t. We assume a syndrome decoding method,
which is able to correct a single error. The system in this case
fails once two errors are generated in the same column. The
probability that a failure is not declared in one column is:
qh = (1− p)7 + 7p (1− p)6 . (11)
TABLE I
SYNTHESIS RESULTS FOR EACH METHOD, SHOWING TOTAL MODULE
COUNTS AND THE EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF NAND GATES PER LFSR
Method FF XOR2 AND2 AND3 Maj NAND eq.
TMR 120 12 0 0 40 242.5
TMR (one col.) 120 12 0 0 4 220
Hamming 70 167 0 70 0 235.375
Hamming (one col) 70 23 0 7 0 139.5
Parity-Check 55 159 55 0 0 209.375
The probability of an instantaneous failure in the system is:
PFail = 1−
10∏
k=1
qh (12)
Using this method, with p = 10−3, the MTTF is equal to
4713 clock cycles. To reduce the complexity, decoding can be
performed only in one column. To determine the MTTF for
this method, we modify the method used for the one-column
TMR method. Since Hamming decoding is performed for a
single column only, the flip-flop error propagation is modeled
by the trellis process in Fig. 3, and the probability of flip-flop
error in the decoder’s column is pv as given by (6). Since a
system failure is produced by two or more errors among the
flip-flops in the decoded column, we find that
PFail = 1−
[
(1− pv)7 + 7pv (1− pv)6
]
. (13)
We find, with p = 10−3, MTTF = 501. Once again the MTTF
is made worse, with a possible gain in complexity.
V. COMPLEXITY AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
All of the described methods were evaluated in term of
hardware complexity and MTTF. The designs are composed
of simple components: flip-flops (FF), 1bit XOR2 modules,
and 3-input AND (AND3) gates. The associated equivalent
NAND complexity is evaluated for each synthesis product as
reported in Table I. Given a probability of an upset in one flip
flop, p = 10−3, results from the analyse of the mean time to
failure and the complexity of diferents method are summarised
in Fig. 6. From this figure we can see that the full TMR method
provides MTTF close to ten thousand clock cycles, but this is
more than what is needed since the PRN are of length 1023.
The full Hamming method’s MTTF of 4713 is not really a loss
since all registers are reinitialized to ones every 1023 cycles.
Now by varying the probability of the upset p, the MTTF of all
solutions are compared in Fig. 7. The 1023 MTTF threshold
is shown as a dashed line in Figs. 6 and 7.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our results show a roughly exponential improvement in
MTTF with increasing gate complexity. The best choice of
protection depends on the technology’s upset probability. For
a high upset probability, the full Hamming or TMR method
may be necessary to achieve an acceptable MTTF. For a small
upset probability, the the Hamming (one col.) method provides
the required MTTF, but reduces the gate complexity by 42%
compared to full TMR.
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Fig. 6. Complexity and performance of the proposed methods with p = 10−3.
The dashed line indicates the PRN length.
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Fig. 7. Performance as a function of the upset probability p. The dashed line
indicates the PRN length.
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